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1. Introduction
The “Arab Spring,” followed by the demonstration in 
Tunisia at the end of 2010, with “revolution” as its 
theme, gradually became widespread with the ultimate 
aim of overthrowing the Arab monarchy of the Persian 
Gulf countries, that is, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), especially Saudi Arabia, which was its axis. In 
February 2011, 10 Saudis, including a university 
teacher, formed a group, calling themselves the “Umma 
Islamic Party” and demanding that the government 
consider them a political party. And others made a call 
to spark demonstration on March 11, 2010, by naming 
it as “the day of rage” on the web. However, the 
members of the party were arrested as soon as they 
made the declaration. And they were banned from 
traveling abroad, and the group was outlawed. And the 
“day of rage” passed with minor demonstrations.1 As 
an exception among the GCC, Manama, the capital of 
Bahrain, saw a huge protest in February 2011 with the 
participation of more than 7,000 people. However, it 
was soon quelled when Saudi Arabia sent 1,500 troops 
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the request of 
the Bahrain government [Matthiesen 2013: 50]. 
Therefore, no crucial protest occurred in GCC that 
could lead to the defeat of the monarchy, and Saudi 
Arabia succeeded in not only maintaining the regime 
but also making GCC the breakwater against the Arab 
Spring.
However, after the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia 
realized that the country’s security was under threat and 
reinforced measures to prevent any such happenings 
in the future. One of the main reasons for this was 
that, although Iran, a rival Shiite axis in the region, 
had expanded its influence to destabilize neighboring 
countries such as Syria and Yemen, the expansion of 
political Islamism aiming to realize Islamic values 
in the country through democracy, as represented by 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and the rise of extremism 
in the “Islamic State” (ISIL) was a serious concern 
for Saudi Arabia. Since these factions belonged to the 
Islamic Sunni sect, same as Saudi Arabia, they rejected 
Saudi legitimacy as an Islamic country and could have 
potential mass appeal. To counter this, Saudi Arabia 
made efforts to prevent the infiltration of Islamism and 
extremism, through the rebranding the country’s Islamic 
discourse. What this paper examines is this transition.
2. Rebranding “Official” Islam
(1) From Wahhabism to Salafism
First, a brief background to the Islamic discourse that 
arose in Saudi Arabia and the position of Islam in the 
country is presented. The dynasty in present-day Saudi 
Arabia is the third; its history began in 1902 when the 
house of Saud captured the present capital, Riyadh, 
following the first dynasty (1744/5-1818) and the 
second (1820-89). The founding ideology of the 
country dates to 1744, when an Islamic scholar, 
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-91), and a tribal 
leader, Muhammad ibn Saud (1687-1765, r. 1744-65), 
1 “Pro-reform Saudi activists launch political party,” Reuters, 11 Feb. 2011, “Saudi Arabia detains founders of new activist party,” 
Reuters, 20 Feb. 2011, “Saudi Arabian security forces quell 'day of rage' protests,” The Guardian, 11 Mar. 2011.
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made a religio-politico pact in Dir‘iyya district, located 
at the Najd area in the central part of the Arabian 
Peninsula [DeLong-Bas 2001: 34-35]. In the pact, Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhab made a call for the practice of 
righteous Islam by banning idolatry and other 
polytheistic practices, establishing a country ruled by 
Islamic teachings, and creating a society by promoting 
virtue and preventing vice.2 
Saudi Arabia’s stance toward Islam can be traced 
to these rigid ideas of monotheism and to building 
a political framework and public sphere based on 
religion, started by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and often 
called “Wahhabism” (al-wahhābīya). However, Saudi 
Arabia has sometimes recused itself from the country’s 
founding ideology, Wahhabism, and instead followed 
what they called “Salafism” (al-salafīya). Salafism 
means, in general, following the paths of righteous 
ancestors (salaf), who learned Islam directly through 
the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. This 
meant excluding the innovation not seen during the 
prophet’s time and adopting only the holy Qur’an and 
the Sunna (deeds and sayings) of Prophet Muhammad 
as the inerrable texts of Islam. Although these ideas 
are common to Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia recognizes 
that the term “Wahhabism” is often used by others in a 
derogatory way, projecting a negative image of Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, they tried to rebrand the “official” 
name of the country’s Islam from Wahhabism to 
Salafism, as can be seen in the speeches of successive 
kings [al-‘Aql 2007: 394-395]:
The people named us “followers of Wahhab,” 
and call us “Wahhabist” regarding it as a specific 
school. However, it is a dreadful error derived 
from false propaganda spread by ill-willed 
people. We are not a group of innovators; nor 
are followers of innovative teaching and neither 
was Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab a man of 
innovation. Our teaching is derived from the 
Book of Allah and the Sunna of His messenger. It 
is the teaching of salaf, a legacy from the fathers. 
(King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1928)
The people say that the kingdom follows the 
school of Wahhab, different from the other four 
schools of fiqh.3 However, Wahhabism is not a 
school but a reforming religious movement in an 
age when falsity and prejudice flourished. This 
movement fought against innovations and 
returned to the principles; it then grew beyond 
being just a religious movement which the 
kingdom followed. Despite this, we have been 
maligned and accused of wronghood without any 
evidence. (King Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1986)
These two speeches appealed that Saudi Arabia was 
disgraced by the name “Wahhabist,” and that it sought 
to eradicate this stigma by calling the ideology as “the 
teaching of salaf,” or Salafism4.
(2) Government-led “Moderation and Tolerance”
This rebranding of Wahhabism as Salafism occurred 
during the 1950s-60s with the transition of Saudi Arabia 
to a “cosmopolitan Salafi world” in the context of its (a) 
increasing number of foreign workers and students 
[Commins 2015: 161-162; Farquhar 2018: 165-166], (b) 
economic development after the discovery of oil in 
1937, and (c) newly established universities, which are 
strongholds today in teaching Wahhabism.5 On the back 
of this domestic change, after the 1950s, the government 
2 ‘Promotion of virtue and prevention of vice,’ often called “hisba,” is a basic teaching for Saudi “religious police,” whose official 
name is the Committee of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice [Takao 2019: 7-12].
3 “Four schools” mean four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh); Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali.
4 However, there is also an interpretation not always avoiding “Wahhabism” among religious scholars. For example, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn 
‘Abdullah ibn Baz (1911-99), who was appointed as the Grand Mufti in 1993, explained “Wahhabism” as follows. ““Wahhabism” 
is rooted in the mission of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and reveals the nature of monotheism and polytheism … it is the 
obligatory on all Muslims, in following the virtues of the teachings of salaf on the method, dogma, sayings, and deeds” [Ibn Bāz 
1997: 230-233]. From this explanation, there is hesitation in criticizing the use of the term “Wahhabism”; rather, he implicates the 
interchangeability of “Wahhabism” and “Salafism.”  
5 For example, Umm al-Qura University at Mecca (1949), Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University (1953) and King Saud University 
(1957) at Riyadh, Islamic University of Medina at Medina (1961).
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formed the country’s religious establishment centered 
on the Committee of Senior Scholars (Hai’a Kibar al-
‘Ulama), which had the authority to issue Islamic legal 
opinions (fatwa) to form the official framework of 
Islam in the country [Al Atawneh 2010: 8]. Besides, 
newly established international organizations such as 
the Muslim World League (1962, Mecca) and the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (1972, Jedda) 
became useful for Saudi scholars spread their teachings 
abroad. Saudi Arabia thus changed the axis of the 
country’s Islamic discourse from Wahhabism, proper to 
the Saudi context, to Salafism, which Muslims across 
the world epistemologically could share [Hammond 
2018: 154-155].
However, during the 1990s-2000s, several bombing 
incidents took place in Saudi Arabia, targeting 
governmental and US facilities [Hegghammer 2010: 
203-215]. Then, 9/11 occurred, in which 15 among 
the 19 accused were from Saudi Arabia. This led to 
the Saudi government realizing the need to prevent 
the spread of extremism and to prove to the world that 
the country’s Islamic discourse had nothing to do with 
extremism. Crown Prince ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 
(1924-2015, r. 2005-2015) handled the affairs of the 
state instead of King Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1923-
2005, r. 1982-2005), who had been hospitalized after a 
stroke, and he used the country’s banner of a “moderate 
and tolerant Islam,” especially on those who had turned 
toward extremism, in order to guide them on the right 
path. This banner, was directed to achieve a certain goal 
by conducting activities such as ideological correction 
programs for the rehabilitation of the detainees of 
militant activities, and activities called “religious 
dialogue” represented by the meeting with John Pope II 
of the Vatican (2007). That is, the government aimed to 
prevent the spread of extremism within the country, and 
to shed country’s negative image abroad.
With these events, the form of Islamic discourses 
took a new turn and became a political issue in which 
the security of the country and region played an 
important role. To create a “moderate and tolerant” 
image of the Islamic discourse became the task 
of mainly security and educational bodies, or the 
government itself, along with the princes. However, the 
religious establishment did not play any role except in 
giving legitimacy to the governmental policies through 
preachment, fatwa, etc. After the Arab Spring, such 
government’s initiative regarding the formation of 
Islamic discourse became stronger.
3. Toward the Age of Transition
(1) Salafism Post Arab Spring 
After the Arab Spring, the word “Salafism” came to be 
frequently used by the media and in research. The word 
referred mainly to the political movement of Islam 
represented by the “Salafist party” that emerged in 
Egypt and Tunisia after the political change [Cavatorta 
& Merone (eds.) 2016]. In addition, “Salafism” began 
to be associated with extremism, and by this definition, 
some factions confronting existing regimes in the name 
of Islam were called as “Salafists.” Originally, both 
“Wahhabism” and “Salafism” had been often used in 
place of “extremism,” to indicate “fundamentalism.” 
However, Salafism, different from Wahhabism, is a 
term that could be understood by all Muslims who 
recognize “Salaf.” Saudi Arabia aspired to use this 
term to project its image of a “moderate and tolerant 
Islam.” If political Islamism, after the Arab Spring, 
had become firmly fixed as Salafism and penetrated the 
entire Muslim world, the regime of Saudi Arabia, that 
is the monarchy, which had been promoting Salafism, 
would become a contradiction. Besides, the efforts 
of the government from the 2000s onward toward 
portraying the country’s “moderate and tolerant Islam” 
would become to be futile. Therefore, Saudi Arabia 
tried to extricate Salafism from the context of Islamism 
or extremism.
A symbolic event representing this was a conference 
held at Imam University, Riyadh, in December 2012, 
titled “Sharia’s Approach to Salafism and the State’s 
Requirement”. As the guest of honor at the conference, 
Naif ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the Crown Prince and the first 
deputy prime minister, Ministry of Interior, at the time, 
declared this in his opening remarks: 
Our country has followed Salafism since the pact 
between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and it is the pride of Saudi 
Arabia even today.6
The conference intended “to clarify the teachings of the 
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Salafi movement, its righteous source and principles, 
and the approach of righteous Islam toward non-
Muslims,” and “to clarify the relationship between 
Salafism, the founding ideology of Saudi Arabia and its 
modern religious discourse and the domestic education 
curriculum.”7 The president of Imam University at that 
time, Dr. Sulaiman Aba al-Khail, declared that “all of 
the policies of the kingdom are based on the teachings 
of Salafism.” In the conference, he also emphasized 
“that the governance of Saudi Arabia is based on true 
Islamic faith,” and made a call to “strengthen patriotism 
within the country.” The conference, he said, was to 
“remove hostility toward Islam and Salafism,” 
“revealing the role of the kingdom in contributing to 
peace and stability,” and “underlining that Salafism is a 
stance to defeat terrorism.”8
Through such declarations, we realize that present-
day Salafism in Saudi Arabia was a way to exclude 
hostility and violence toward the country by rebranding 
it as a way of countering terrorism. Aba al-Khail 
proclaimed that “while the world of Islam is confused 
by the several discourses, our country has been the 
mediator or custodian,” and “[Salafism is] a lifestyle; 
its structure of Islam can be followed by Muslims 
across nations, and this country, undoubtedly, is 
following the right path of its sayings and deeds.”9 
From this speech, it is clear that the Saudi side intends 
to maintain Salafism as its national ideology leading to 
the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic country.
The important point here is that adopting Salafism, 
as illustrated in this conference, was a non-political 
move by Saudi Arabia in rejecting political movements 
or militant activities, but a very political move in 
calling it the national ideology at the same time. In 
short, the idea was to maintain the legitimacy of the 
regime. However, considering the existing debates on 
whether Salafism is political or non-political [Bonnefoy 
2016: 205; Meijer 2016: 219; Kuschnitzki 2016: 104-
105; Wegemakers 2016: 7], such discourses continue 
to raise questions on the unique point of Saudi Arabia 
making Islam the national religion.
(2) In the Aftermath of “Saudi Vision 2030”
We now discuss how the Islamic discourse in Saudi 
Arabia was formed after its rebranding, as mentioned 
above, under the reign of King Salman ibn ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz (1935-, r. 2015-). During King ‘Abdullah’s reign, 
with the majority of the population below 30 years, 
there was increasing empowerment of women: the 
government sponsored female students to study abroad, 
appointed a female vice minister for the first time in the 
country, and partially abolished single-sex education. 
Although these were not always in conformance with 
traditional values in Saudi Arabia based on Wahhabism, 
the government tried to maintain the stability of the 
regime by responding to youth and women, the majority 
of the population, and created an atmosphere to bring in 
“change” in the society.
Salman’s regime initially sought to follow the 
conservative path with the removal of two symbolic 
reformist figures whom King ‘Abdullah had appointed; 
Nora al-Fayez, the Deputy Minister of Education, and 
‘Abdullatif ibn ‘Abdullah, the president of the 
Committee of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of 
Vice (current Minister of Islamic Affaires). However, 
when the national project “Saudi Vision 2030” (Vision 
2030) was launched in April 2016, the government 
became more proactive in creating “change” than the 
previous regime. This is because the scope of Vision 
2030, an economic reform project, involves the 
promotion of the entertainment industry and the 
furthering of women’s rights.10 Hence, after 2017, the 
government lifted the ban on women watching football 
in stadiums (January 2018) and on driving cars (June 
2018), besides permitting the re-opening of cinemas in 
Riyadh (April 2018) to hold events such as comic 
contests and music concerts. A new governmental body, 
the General Presidency for Entertainment (Hai’a al-
‘Amma li-l-Tarfih), was established in May 2016 to 
coordinate such events. These policies were welcomed, 
especially by Western countries that viewed Saudi 
Arabia as a conservative nation where discrimination 
against women was deep-rooted.
6 al-Riyāḍ, 20, Jan. 2012, 23.
7 Arab News, 28, Dec. 2011, 1, al-Riyāḍ, 12, Jan. 2012, 34.
8 al-Waṭan (Saudi Arabia), 25, Dec. 2011, 11.
9 al-Riyāḍ, 12, Jan. 2012, 34.
10 See the official website of Vision 2030. https://vision2030.gov.sa/
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Leading this  “change” in Saudi  society is 
Muhammad ibn Salman (1985-), who became Crown 
Prince in June 2017. Traditionally, leading figures in the 
official religious establishment were opposed to these 
policies that would lead to “change” in society. They 
believed that women driving cars or going to football 
stadiums and cinemas would allow them to easily meet 
men, without being recognized. This would probably 
lead to the violation of Islamic teachings about sex 
morals.11 Even after the launch of Vision 2030, for 
example, in May 2017, it was reported that ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah (1943-), the Grand Mufti of the 
Kingdom, criticized a preacher who supported the 
government’s stance on entertainment activities.12 
However, these opposing views toward Vision 2030 
almost disappeared after June 2017. On September 27, 
2017, the day after the announcement on lifting the ban 
on women driving, some media reported that the 
Committee of Senior Scholars, the axis of the religious 
establishment, approved this move. This was the turning 
point, when religious scholars chose not to oppose 
“change” and when Muhammad ibn Salman’s initiatives 
for policies toward “change” were established, not the 
beginning of Salman’s regime, the launch of Vision 
2030, or the rising expectations for “change” among the 
youth. Later, the “change” led by the Crown Prince was 
heralded as for the enjoyment of the people, especially 
the “majority,” as explained, under the control of 
religious scholars.
4. Islamic Discourse toward the Age of 
Transition
(1) “Before 1979” as a Turning Point
We now discuss Islamic discourse under Salman’s 
regime. While Vision 2030 restricts the influence of 
religious scholars, it is associated with a thought control 
program for “strengthening the spirit of nationality” to 
“cultivate tolerant and moderate religious thought.”13 
Perhaps the first occasion when this was referred to was 
in the speech of Muhammad ibn Salman delivered at 
the economic forum held in Riyadh, October 2017, 
“The Future Investment Initiative.” He explained this 
as follows:
We just need to go back to the state “before 1979,” 
that is, return to a moderate and tolerant Islam (al-
islam al-wasati al-mu＇tadil) open to the world, to all 
religions and traditions, and people …. In a situation 
where 70 % of the population is under 30 years, 
frankly speaking, we should not waste time in 
responding to fateful ideas for the [next] 30 years. 
… What we must hope for is a natural life reflecting 
our noble religion, customs, and good traditions … 
Soon, I＇ll mop up left extremism (al-tatarruf) … 
Before 1979, Saudi Arabia and its surrounding areas 
were not as they are today. It is only after 1979 the 
problem of Sahwa began to spread.14
While this speech was cited in some domestic and 
foreign media,15 it was not considered important in the 
context of Islamic discourse possibly because the 
banner for a “moderate and tolerant Islam” had already 
been raised by King ‘Abdullah in the previous reign. 
11 Independent, “Saudi Arabia’s top Islamic cleric says women would be ‘exposed to evil’ if allowed to drive,” 11 Apr. 2017. From this 
point of view, the prominent religious figures have criticized women’s driving car and entertainment facilities and events since the 
latter part of the 20th century. Gulf News, “Saudi Grand Mufti says women should not drive,” 10 Apr. 2016, Reuters, “Saudi Arabia's 
religious authority says cinemas, song concerts harmful,” 15 Jan. 2017, The New Arab, “Saudi religious authorities back women 
driving, contradicting years of strict opposition,” 27 Sep. 2017.
12 Gulf News, “Scholars divided over imam's fatwa on music,” 29 Jun. 2010, Rt Question More, “Top Saudi cleric slams preachers who 
approve music & singing,” 31 May 2017.
13 See the official website of Vision 2030 (https://vision2030.gov.sa/). For more details focusing on the process of the project, and 
comparison with “Vision” of neighbor countries, see the research of P. Joyce and T. Al Rasheed [Joyce and Al Rasheed 2017: 93ff.].
14 “Muḥammad bin Salmān: sanaqḍī ‘alā al-taṭarruf, sana‘ūd ilā al-islām al-wasaṭī,” al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, 25 Oct. 2017.
15 “Crown prince says Saudis want return to moderate Islam,” BBC, 25 Oct. 2017, “Attention: Saudi Prince in a Hurry,” The New York 
Times, 7 Nov. 2017, “Saudi’s Mohammed bin Salman promises return to ‘moderate open Islam’,” The National, 24 Oct. 2017. 
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Furthermore, as for “before 1979, there was no room 
for argument by the people. The year 1979 marked the 
birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran, an issue most 
important concerning the security of today’s Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, it is only natural in the Saudi context 
to interpret “before 1979” as “before Iran.”16
However, we realize that the Crown Prince 
Muhammad seemed to bear in mind the domestic 
situation, rather than the regional issue, by referring to 
“before 1979.” Thus, he regarded “1979” as the turning 
po in t  no t  o f  the  reg ion ,  bu t  o f  the  coun t ry. 
Understandably, “1979” was the year of the problem 
from within, rather than without. In the domestic 
context, it reminded the people of the incident of 
militant occupation of Haram Mosque in Mecca in 
November that year. The incident of Juhayman al-
‘Utaybi, a Saudi mastermind, demanding the abdication 
of King Khalid ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1913-82, r. 1975-82) 
by holding about a 1,000 people hostage shocked the 
Saudi people.17 However, as this was a sporadic event, 
its influence was limited to the government and society 
after it was suppressed [Lacroix 2005: 39-40]. 
Madawi al-Rasheed, a Saudi anthropologist based 
in London, explains that 1979 was “the year when 
Saudi radicalization was born,” with the emergence of 
regional issues such as the birth of Iran.18 She then 
points out the problem with “moderate and tolerant 
Islam,” such as an educational curriculum biased 
toward Wahhabism, the “official” religious circles not 
representing the voice of Sufism or Shiites, which 
Wahhabism finds heresy, and the legal system 
prohibiting the construction of religious facilities except 
for Islam. However, it was not other religions or sects 
that the Crown Prince supposed on “moderate and 
tolerant Islam.” Another important viewpoint was 
explained by Nabil Mouline, a historian of Islam in 
Saudi Arabia, who said that “1979” was the year when 
the “old structures of power and authority turned out to 
be necessary.” In other words, the period “before 1979” 
saw the escalation of religious establishment because 
“tacit alliance between the Al Saud (house of Saud) and 
the ulama was reactivated [Mouline 2015: 57].” This 
led to the possibility that “before 1979,” means a 
rebalancing of the relationship between politics and 
religion in the country.19 That means, the Crown Prince 
intended to again reduce of the influence of the 
religious bodies with the regime. 
(2) Cleanup of “Sahwa” Members
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore “Sahwa,” the only 
example the Crown Prince referred to in his explanation 
of “before 1979.” Sahwa was the name used for a group 
that demanded the government to undertake political 
reform after the Gulf War between 1990 and 1991 
[Lacroix 2010: 202-210; Freer 2018: 25, 90]. They 
wrote down their complaints on submitted document, 
asking for a stricter adaptation of Islamic rules in the 
country’s system, independence of legislative and 
judicial power, advancement of ‘Ulama, cleaning up 
corruption in governmental bodies, etc [Al-Sarhan2015: 
16 In fact, such recognition was seen among the high-ranking persons around the Crown Prince, as represented by the recent speech of 
Khalid ibn Salman, the Vice Minister of Defense, who used the expression “before 1979” in the talk about Iran and regional security. 
“Khālid bin Salmān: al-Nīzām al-Īrānī yad‘am al-taṭarruf wa-l-irhāb munz 1979‚” al-Ḥayāt, 25 Apr. 2019.
17 Al-‘Utaybi is a member of ‘Utayba, a potent tribe in the middle of Arabian Peninsula. In the early 20th century, when King ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz was working on a mission to extend the territory of Islam, the ‘Utayba tribe collaborated with him as one of main forces of the 
ex-legionary. However, after King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz began to give precedence to stable governance rather than the mission, some of the 
members of ‘Utayba rose in revolt. This led to war, and the ‘Utayba was brought down in 1929. For al-‘Utaybi, therefore, the house 
of Saud was a subject of vengeance [Steinberg 2017: 27-28].
18 Madawi al-Rasheed, “Can the Saudi Crown Prince Transform the Kingdom?” The New York Times, 10 Nov. 2017. Nonetheless, there 
is no doubt about the importance of the year 1979 for Saudi and its regional security, because of not only the birth of Iran but also the 
signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (March), the rise to power of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (July), the militant siege 
of the Haram Mosque in Mecca (November), and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December). Al-Rasheed also refers to these.
19 Regarding news concerning this, see “Public Decency (dhawq al-‘āmm) Law.” Although the details of this are not clear yet (as of 
September 2019), this law was passed in April 2019, led by the Ministry of Interior. Underlying this was the fact that the Committee 
of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which policed people in public places on whether they followed Islamic 
teachings, had been restricted in its activities before and after Vision 2030, leading to an abridgment of investigative authority. The 
government began to show a strong tendency of leading religious issues, which were traditionally handled by religious bodies.
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183-184]. The signatories of the document comprised 
Safar al-Hawali (1950-), a teacher of Islamic studies at 
the Umm al-Qura University; Salman Awda (1955-), 
a popular preacher in Burayda city, Qasim province; 
and other figures from religious, educational, and 
legal institutes. This meant that the people who had 
complaints were from various fields, despite some 
of them working as civil servants, and it also meant 
that the expansion of Islamism was not limited to the 
religious circles but had spread among intellectuals as 
well [Kéchichian 2013: 34-37]. Although not the axis 
of the religious establishment, they belonged to the elite 
in the regime. The government, cautious about being 
criticized from an Islamic viewpoint, tried to stop the 
influence of Sahwa in the country, by displacing these 
members from their official position, penalizing them 
by banning their travel abroad, and putting them under 
house arrest.
As Sahwa’s main activities were seen in the early 
1990s, there was no contradiction that there had been a 
time gap to pick them up from the context of “1979.” It 
was important that this was not a sporadic event, as it 
led to the emergence of Osama bin Laden (1957-2011) 
and several bombing attacks in the country [Steinberg 
2017: 30-33]. Besides, just before the speech of “before 
1979” by the Crown Prince, in September 2017, dozens 
of people, mainly ex-members of Sahwa, were arrested 
together.20 Considering this, it is possible that the Crown 
Prince may have indicated the existence of Sahwa in 
referring to “mopping up left extremism.”
Furthermore, it was significant that on May 6, 2019 
(the first day of Ramadan of 1440 Hijri year), on the 
pro-government channel’s TV, “Liwan,” ‘Ayd al-Qarni 
(1960-), a Saudi scholar of Islam, appeared live on the 
show and referred to Sahwa. al-Qarni, who is well 
known even abroad for several teaching books, such as 
Don’t be Sad (La tahzan), said that there had been a 
recent attempt to assassinate him in Philippines during 
his visit for a lecture in March 2016.21 He is also known 
for being a member of Sahwa and, on the internet, he 
had in fact been critical of the government’s policies. 
However, in recent years, he had maintained political 
silence and committed to moderate preachment on TV 
programs about Islam. This may be the reason why he 
was not taken into custody during the mass arrest of the 
members of Sahwa in September 2017, as described 
above. In May 2019, he talked about Sahwa and 
himself on a live TV show, attracting attention among 
the Saudis.22
I am today supportive of the moderate Islam, 
open to the world, which has been called for 
by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman…
We invite the world to come over ... our religion 
was sent as a mercy and safety to mankind…
In the name of Al-Sahwa, I apologize to Saudi 
society for the mistakes that have contradicted 
the Qur’an and Sunnah, and contradicted the 
tolerance of Islam, a moderate religion.
Thus, al-Qarni repented publicly for his past anti-
governmental activities and extended his support to the 
present leading government. The Saudi media was 
abuzz with voices praising his attitude.23 Although the 
context of his appearance on the TV show is unclear, it 
is impossible that the government would not have 
known it, considering his career and his public persona. 
Rather, it is possible that the government proposed his 
appearance on the show for confession. Anyway, his 
criticism of Sahwa was mutually beneficial for him and 
the government. For al-Qarni, it ensured his safety in 
the country; the show of loyalty to the present 
government and appreciation was repaid by him not 
being put under mass arrest in September 2017. For the 
government, rather than by someone known to be pro-
government, or non-political, this public atonement of 
al-Qarni, who was previously committed to anti-
governmental activities, was expected to persuade 
citizens about the campaign for a “moderate and 
tolerant Islam.”
20 “Saudi clerics detained in apparent bid to silence dissent,” Reuters, 11 Sep. 2017.
21 “Sheikh Aaidh al-Qarni, Saudi preacher, shot in Philippines,” The Guardian, 2 Mar. 2016.
22 “Saudi cleric apologizes for ‘intolerant’ views of Sahwa movement,” Arab News, 7 May 2019.
23 For example, a Saudi actor Nasil al-Qasabi referred to this. “al-Qaṣabī: 4 malā’īn qara’ū taghrīdatī…wa-‘alā rumūz al-ṣaḥwa al-
iqtidā’ bi-l-Qarnī,” ‘Ukāẓ, 10 May 2019. “Su‘ūdīyūn: mawqif ‘Āyḍ al-Qarnī shujā‘ wa-i‘tidhār-hu qayyim,” al-‘Arabīya, 9 May 
2019.
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5. Conclusion
The transition of Islamic discourse in Saudi Arabia 
involved the rebranding of Wahhabism as Salafism to 
avoid the ideology being criticized as “sectarian” or 
“extremist.” Under the reign of ex-King ‘Abdullah, 
the new banner of a “moderate and tolerant Islam” 
was introduced by the government. Presently, the 
term “before 1979” has succeeded the existing banner, 
seemed to focus on Iran, a rival country, for dealing 
with security issues. However, this paper observes that 
“before 1979” is a reflection of the domestic scene, and 
hence concludes by pointing out the possibility that 
“before 1979” is aimed at a rebalance of the religio-
politico relationship. The final aim is to continue 
Vision 2030 by reducing the influence of the religious 
establishment, and to maintain stability of the regime, 
including that of Crown Prince Muhammad, who leads 
Vision 2030 and would become the next king in the 
natural course of events. Besides, this paper focuses 
more on the fact that Sahwa was referred to in the 
speech of “before 1979” and confirms that there was 
a cleanup of the remnants of Sahwa in the country. 
However, the external issue, such as the problem of 
Iran, is not completely unrelated to this banner. Rather, 
“before 1979” was apparently meant to work on the 
external menace represented by Iran, in parallel with 
responding to “Saudi radicalization,” which, as al-
Rasheed pointed out previously, was the immediate 
problem; in other words, the banner was to tackle both 
internal and external issues.
To prove this, al-Qarni mentioned, during his 
appearance on the TV show, that the Qatar government 
had approached the member of Sahwa, to offer support 
to the relatives of the Muslim Brotherhood.24 To this 
statement, there were strong reactions from some high-
ranking persons from Saudi Arabia and abroad, such as 
‘Abdullatif ibn ‘Abdullah, Saudi Minister of Islamic 
Affairs, Dawah and Guidance, and Anwar Muhammad 
Qarqash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. 
They criticized Qatar’s interference in the affairs of 
another country, based on the words of al-Qarni.25 The 
cleanup of Sahwa can be the breakthrough for the Saudi 
government and that of countries close to it to eliminate 
the menace of the Muslim Brotherhood affecting the 
security of the broader region.26 
More importantly, the Saudi government decided to 
invite the US army into the country on July 19, 2019, 
for the first time in 16 years since the fall of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq in 2003. For Saudi Arabia, which 
needed a breakthrough in the Yemen war since March 
2015 and reduce the influence of Iran in the region, the 
timing of this decision made great sense. On the other 
hand, it also reminds one of the histories of stationing 
the US army on the occasion of the Gulf War, which led 
to a stream of anti-governmental movements, of which 
Sahwa was the first wave. Considering this, the series 
of events related to Sahwa as previously explained, 
such as the mass arrest in September 2017, reference 
to Sahwa in the Crown Prince’s “before 1979” speech 
in October, and al-Qarni’s criticism of Sahwa in May 
2019, might have been preparing the ground for war 
against any voice of protest expected by the government 
inviting the US army. 
This comprehensive nature of “moderate and 
tolerant Islam” in “before 1979” corresponds to Vision 
2030, covering the establishment of an economic zone, 
housing supply, control of religious bodies and figures, 
etc. Or, one must take a comprehensive view of Vision 
2030, which is sometimes viewed as an economic 
reform plan, considering its encompassing nature, and 
of “before 1979” as an inevitable part of it.
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Mujtama‘.
Joyce, Paul and Al Rasheed, Turki. 2017. Public Governance 
and Strategic Management Capabilities: Public Governance 
in the Gulf States. New York/London: Routledge.
Kéchichian, Joseph A. 2013. Legal and Political Reforms in 
Sa’udi Arabia. London/New York: Routledge.
Kostiner, Joseph. 2005. “Coping with Regional Challenges: A 
Case Study of Crown Prince Abdullah's Peace,” in Paul 
Aarts and Gerd Monneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the 
Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, 
352–371. London: Hurst.
Kuschnirzki, Judit. 2016. “The Establishment and Positioning 
of Al-Rashad: A Case Study of Political Salafism in 
Yemen,” Salafism after the Arb Awakening: Contending 
with People’s Power, 99–117. Oxford/New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lacroix, Stéphane. 2005. “Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi 
Arabia,” in Paul Aarts and Gerd Monneman (eds.), Saudi 
Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign 
Affairs, 35–56. London: Hurst.
―――. 2010. Les islamistes Saoudiens: une insurrection 
manquée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
―――. 2016. “To Rebel or Not to Rebel: Dilemmas among 
Saudi Salafis in Revolutionary Age,” in Francesco 
Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (eds.), Salafism after the 
Arb Awakening: Contending with People’s Power, 61–82. 
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Matthiesen, Toby. 2013. Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, 
and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Mouline, Nabil. 2015. “Enforcing and Reinforcing the State’s 
Islam: The Functioning of the Committee of Senior 
Scholars,” in Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer 
and Stéphane Lacroix (eds.), Saudi Arabia in Transition: 
Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious 
Change, 48–67. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Meijer, Roel. 2016. “Conclusion: Salafis and the Acceptance 
of the Political,” in Paul Aarts and Gerd Monneman (eds.), 
Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, 
Foreign Affairs, 219–239. London: Hurst.
Steinberg, Guido. 2005. “To Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi 
State: 1745 to the Present,” in Paul Aarts and Gerd 
Monneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political 
Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, 11–34. London: Hurst.
Takao, Kenichiro. 2019. “Policing Public Morality in Modern 
Muslim Societies: ‘Religious Police’ in Saudi Arabia, 
‘Islamic State’ and Aceh,” Journal of Islamic Area Studies, 
11: 3–28. Tokyo: Organization for Islamic Area Studies, 
Waseda University.
Wagemakers, Joas. 2016. “Revisiting Wiktorowicz: Categorising 
and Defining the Branches of Salafism,” in Francesco 
Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (eds.), Salafism after the 
Arb Awakening: Contending with People’s Power, 7–24. 
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Transition of Islamic Discourse in Saudi Arabia: From Wahhabism to “Before 1979”　　35

